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CURRENT DECISIONS
Admiralty-MAINTENcE AND CURE OF SEAMEN-RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN SHIPOWNERS FOR COEXISTING OBLIGATION.

While

in the employ of defendant Texaco, Gooden suffered a back injury
from which he had not fully recovered at the time of his subsequent
employment with defendant Sinclair. In an action against Sinclair by
Gooden for failure to pay the continuing costs of cure and maintenance,' Texaco was impleaded.' The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit allowed contribution between the respondent shipowners for
the period of their coexisting maintenance and cure obligations to the
injured seaman,3 thus raising an important question as to the scope of
the court's authority, sitting in admiralty, to grant contribution accordmg to the equities of the case before them. In searching for a rationale
with which to answer this question, the court has reached a decision
which may have broader implications beyond the quasi-contractual
obligation of the shipowners for cure and maintenance.
The court reached its decision so as "
- to achieve the equitable
result of assuring that the ultimate liability of the supowners remains
the same regardless of how seamen choose or happen to seek recovery "4 Dismissing doubts as to its authority to reach such a decision,
the court found that, absent congressional legislation to the contrary,
the result reached could be reconciled within the court's broad discretionary powers relative to the law of admiralty '
It is an accepted tenet of maritime law that costs of maintenance and
cure are recoverable pursuant to the contract of employment, irrespective of a finding of fault on the part of shipowner in occasioning
the seaman's injury 6 As the fact of the liability of both defendants
1. Gooden v. Texaco, Inc., 255 F Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
2. Frw. R. Civ. P. 14(c). Two separate libels against Texaco (1964) and Sinclair
(1965) were consolidated for trial in which Sinclair impleaded Texaco.
3. Gooden v. Sinclair Refining Company, 378 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1967).
4. Id., at 582.
5. id., at 583.
6. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903); Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130
(1928); Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); G. GiLtOan AND C. BLAcK,THE LAw
OF AD iRALTY 253 (1957). The Court in The Osceola at 169 traces the development of the obligation of a shipowner for cure and maintenance to Article VI
of the Rules of Oleron, Article 18 of the Laws of Wisbuy and similar provisions found
in the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Book III, Tide 4, Article II;and in a Treatise
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during the contested. period was uncontroverted, the importance of
Goden v. Sinclair Refining Company7 is due primarily to the court's
decision to grant contribution. The significance of this allowance of
contribution lies not only in the application of this concept to a case
of first impression arising out of a quasi-contractual obligation; rather
the full impact of the' decision is found in the-possible application of
contribution to the' field'-o maritime tort law.8
Absent the passage of'a statute, courts exercising common law jiarisdiction have generally refused to grant contribution among joint' -tortfbasors in actions for negligence.9 However, admiralty courts' Need not
look to parallel precedenti in the common law "... . in declarirg' the
general maritime law, free from inappropriate common law concepits." 0
Admiralty courts have dealt, nonetheless, with questions of ciitribudon n" and indemnity' 2 arising from the joint liability of shipowners and
upon the Sea Laws, published in 2 Pet. Admiralty Decisions. See Justice'Story's commen-'in Harden V. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Maine 1823).
!'There is perhaps upon this subject a greater extent and uniformity of maritime a~thority, than can probably be found in support of most of those principles of commercial
law, which have been so successfully engrafted into our jurisprudence withirthe last
century.
4"7.Supranote'3.
,8. The theory of contractual, obligation to seamen has given vent of a -conflit as to
whether a shipowner may be indemnified to the extent of costs for maintenance and
cure arising from an injury occasioned through the singular negligence of a third party.
See generally The Federal-No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927); Jones v. Waieriman S.S.
Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946). 9. W. PROSSER, THE LAW ,oF Toirs 274 (3d ed. 1964). (See cases collected therein).
10. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 63.9 (1959). Accord, The
Lottowana, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890)
11. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp, 342 U.S. 282 (1951). An
employee of Haenn was injured -while making repairs on Halcyon's ship. The employee
brought an action for negligence against the shipowner, Halcyon. Haenn was then brought
into the action as a third party defendant on the ground that his negligence had contributed to the injury. The jury found both parties to have been negligent. The
Supreme Court refused to grant contribution to Halcyon c6 ncluding (at 285), ". . . it
would be unwise to fashion new judicial rules of contribution and that the solution
of this problem should await congressional action." It is of interest to note that the
decision of the Supreme Court overruled a contrary finding of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit which granted contribution, limiting such only to the amount
ivhich the employee might have recovered under the Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act had he not elected to sue the shipowner. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d '403
(3d Cir. 1951). The Court of Appeals said (at 406), "Nor do we think it an insuperable obstacle that the result we reach does not satisfy the historical notions' of
'the relation between tortfeasors. The Act (The Harbor Worker's Act) has intervened
in:their affairs, and in so iesponsive a system as the admiralty, we have no difficulty
in reaching the equitable solution to a problem not previously contemplated by judicial
expressions:' See generally Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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third parties to injured persons, with particular emphasis upon the
preeminent tight of Congress to legislate in the area of maritime personal
injury cases.
It is a well-established rule that admiralty courts will apportion dam-.
ages with regard to comparative negligence 3 and allow contribution between joint tortfeasors in collision cases. 14 Previous to the present
case it was understood that contribution would not be permitted between wrongdoers in non-collision cases.'1 The-mainstream of judicial,
thought in this area has thus concerned itself primarily with the right
of a; shipowner to indemnity from a negligent third party within the
purview of congressional legislation governing recovery for personal
injury to dockworkers and seamen.'6
The court in Gooden confined its decision to the novel circumstances
before it in reaching what it felt was an equitable solution based upon
the broad powers of the court in admiralty. It thus granted contribution
despite the conclusion in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Re-,
fittizg Corp.17 a case of first impression in which the Court held that,
. . it would be unwise to fashion new judicial rules of contribution," 18 and also despite the fact that the solution to the problem was
dependent upon congressional action.' 9 In denying contribution to the
shipowner in the Halcyon case the Supreme Court implied that a different decision might infringe upon the power- of Congress to legislate
12. E.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956).

13. E.g., The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); The' Schooner Catherine, 58 U.S. (16
(3d Cir. 1959); Ahlgren v.
Red Star Towing Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
14. E.g,, The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876). See generally ;United States v. Weyerhaeuses Steamship Co., 294 F.2d 179 (1961).
15. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp. 342 U.S. 282, 286 (1951)."
The Supreme Court noted that the record was silent as to the wishes of employers, carriers and shippers concerning the issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors. It was of
the opinion that it -would be in the best interest of justice to leave the situation to Congress where passage of legislation would be preceded by hearings before which the multifold of interests involved could be heard.
16. See, .The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 44 Star. 1424,
33 U.S.C. see. 901 (1927); The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. sec. 688 (1920);
The Public Vessels Act, 43 Star. 1112, 46 U.S.C. sec. 781-790 (1925).
17. 342 U.S. 282 (1951).
18. Id., at 285.
19. See, Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); The Court, at 385, concluded
that by implication Sec. 2 Art. III of the Constitution had made admiral and maritime!
law, the law of the United States, subject to the power of Congress to "alter, qualify.
or supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require."
How.) 170" (1854); Curtis v. A. Garcia Y. Cia, 272 F.2d 235
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with regard to the maximum amount recoverable against the dockworker's employer under the Harbor Workers Act. 20 Later court
decisions were able to circumvent in part the Halcyon decision by
granting indemnity to the shipowner where primary fault lay with
the injured man's employer, basing their decisions upon the ndture of
the contractual relationship between the employer and shipo~vner.2 '
Nevertheless, the Halcyon case seems to have stood as a bar to contri;
bution in cases of mutual fault.22
In seizing upon the rationale of Justice Black, 2a who wrote the
majority opinion in Halcyon, the court in Gooden concludes that in
cases of this kind, where ithere has been no infringement of Any legislative policies, contribution may be granted so long as, .....

liabilities of

reimbursement which are imposed do not increase already existing
liabilities of shipowners toward seamen. And seamen lose no rights which
are now possessed because no obstacle is placed in the way of their recovery in full from whatever source they choose." 2 Thus, it appears that
so long as these conditiofis are met, admiralty will not be adverse to
granting contribution when the equities of the situation so dictate its
application.
The decision here, however, must also be viewed within the narrow
20. 342 U.S. at 286.
21. Ryan Stevedoring Inc. v. Pan-Adantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 134 (1956).
"It is clear that as between themselves, the contractor, as the warrantor of its own
services, cannot use the shipowner's failure to discover and correct petitioner's own
breach of contract cannot here excuse that breach." The employee's injuries were here
the result of improperly stowed cargo which an employee of the ship had failed to
detect. Accord, Waterman S.S. Co. v. Dugan and McNamara Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960)
(applied even though no contract between shipowner and stevedoring company); Reed
v. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) (liability held where company which owned the ship
same as that which hired the longshoreman); Italia Society v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964) (stevedoring company held liable to shipowner for unseaworthiness of ship created by stevedoring company even though no negligence
on part of stevedoring company was shown).
22. E.g., Amerocean Steamship Co. v. Copp, 245 F.2d 291 (9th Cit. 1957); Connors
v. Brown S.S. Co., 115 F.Supp. 775 (W.D. N.Y. 1953); American President Lines v.
Marine Terminals Corp., 135 F.Supp. 363 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Mickle v. The Henriette
Wilhelmine Schulte, 188 F.Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
23. Italia Society v. Oregon Stevedoring Corp., 376 US. 315, 325 (1964) (dissent).
Justice Black, in referring to the holding in the Halcyon case, states: ". . . we held that
the system of compensation which Congress established in the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act as the sole liability of a stevedoring company to
its employees .

. ."

Accord, Ryan Stevedoring Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.

350 U.S. 124, 135 (1956) (dissent).
24. 378 F.2d at 583.
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limits of the circumstances before the court in determining a claim
peculiar to admiralty.2s It is a subject of conjecture, as to the ultimate
effect of the decision upon the field of maritime torts, where previously
contribution has been granted only in collision cases. Perhaps a reconsideration has begun within the law of admiralty due to the inequities
resultant in a failure to share in the payment of joint tort liability where
each is as unintentionally responsible as the other. Such a development
would indeed be in line with the well-accepted theory of apportionment of damages in cases of comparative negligence. It would appear
that, rather than wait upon congressional action, the courts have begun to remedy the injustices reached by a broad application of the rule
in Halcyon. At the very least, the court has filled a gap, heretofore
untouched in the ancient remedy of cure and maintenance to injured
seamen.
Thomas D. Home
Criminal Law-EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL-BURDEN OF

PROOF. While serving a sentence in a State Convict Road Force Camp
in Bedford County, Virginia, James Fields escaped from custody. He
was recaptured within an hour and placed in the county jail, where
he was held for twelve days. During this period an indictment was returned against him for escape and statutory burglary,' but no one discussed the charges with him prior to the date of his trial. When he was
brought into the courtroom to be tried, the presiding judge appointed
an attorney to defend him. After a brief consultation with this attorney
in the rear of the courtroom, Fields pleaded guilty and received sentences totaling six years.'
Fields subsequently petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending that he had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel by virtue of the last-minute appointment. The circuit court
granted the writ but was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of
25. Id., at 582.
. During his hour of freedom, Fields entered a building described in the record only
as "a cabin," apparently to hide from his pursuers. The paucity of information regarding
this charge was later made the subject of comment by the federal court. Fields v.
Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 1967).

2. The total elapsed time between appointment of counsel and sentencing by the
court was estimated at fifteen to thirty minutes. The petitioner testified that the appointed attorney did not question him as to the facts of the case, and did not ask if he
was guilty, prior to recommending a guilty plea. Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 625-6
(4th Cir. 1967).

